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fter the Bundestag voted for Berlin as the new seat of government for a
united Federal Republic in 1991, the reconstruction of the city centre accel-
erated. The sum of $135 billion has been devoted to this massive urban renewal
project by the federal government and the city of Berlin (Figure 1). Former
icons of the East–West division are being replaced by new government and
business complexes, including the former ‘death strip’ at Potsdamer Platz (the
wide zone between the East and West Berlin Walls which spanned several
hundred feet), Pariser Platz at the Brandenburg Gate, Checkpoint Charlie, and
the area around the Reichstag. As Berlin’s city building director, Hans
Stimann, explained, ‘Berlin is the only place in the world where the centre is
empty. It’s like an operation on the heart without the rest of the body feeling
anything.’1
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STAGING THE PAST: LANDSCAPE
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AND ERINNERUNGSPOLITIK AT
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Karen E. Till
The controversies surrounding the re-establishment of a national memorial in Berlin, the
Neue Wache, are examined to discuss the process of public memory. After unification, West
German media continued to define public debate. ‘Established’ interest groups (politicians,
victims, historical experts and citizen groups) were included in media discussions whereas
others (East Germans, marginalized groups) were not. Criticisms about the function,
form and ‘forgetfulness’ of the memorial reflected West German memory politics
(Erinnerungspolitik) about the historical uses of: national institutions, religious (but not
gendered) national symbols, and social categories of victim and perpetrator. In response to
criticisms, a plaque was added to the memorial. Locally, activists created inclusive spaces to
address critically the meaning of the National Socialist past in contemporary landscapes. The
memorial is thus both a material object and a site of negotiation; it remains ‘entangled’ with
the ongoing creation of historical narratives, official visions, local memories and cultural
productions.
A
Stimann’s quote characterizes one way of viewing the new Berlin. From a plan-
ner’s perspective, the Cold War spaces that once bisected the city can be
depicted as red zones on maps, sites where the necessary economic ‘operation
on the heart’ will create an European megalopolis of the twenty-first century.2
Such maps and descriptions of Berlin have become a prevalent way of repre-
senting the city because of the unprecedented scale of physical construction,
and because (West) Berlin will no longer be subsidized by the Federal Republic
and must rebuild its economy. Yet what is missing from the planner’s perspec-
tive are the views of local residents who must live in these changing landscapes.
In this paper I argue that many Berliners do not see their city centre as ‘empty’
but rather as historically rich, complex built environments that embody the con-
tradictory meanings of being German.
One way to understand the social changes following unification from both
the national and local scales is through an examination of public monuments.
As Nuala Johnson and others have argued, the study of landmarks offers us
insights into the ways nationalist political discourses are articulated.3 Moreover,
because the creation of official landscapes is a process involving many social
groups, a study of one place can help us understand how citizens interpret, use
and contest their urban public spaces. A focus on the negotiation of cultural
identities at a particular site of memory in Berlin following unification may be
especially insightful when symbolic systems, social relations, expectations of the
state and everyday landscapes are in flux.4
In this article, I examine the public debates about one memorial with a com-
plex history, the Neue Wache (or ‘New Guardhouse’) (Figure 2). Originally built
in 1816–18 as the Prussian king’s palace guard, the neoclassical pavilion was
redesigned as a war memorial during the Weimar Republic and again during
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Figure 1 ~ Map of urban renewal sites in the district of Berlin-Mitte in grey (source:
National Geographic Dec. 1996, p. 105)
the Nazi regime. After the Second World War it functioned as the East German
site for commemorating ‘victims of fascism’. Following unification, the Neue
Wache was declared the ‘new’ unified German national memorial for ‘victims of
war and oppression’. After setting up this historical context, I describe the nego-
tiation of public memory at the site as it appeared in the printed press in
1992–93. In the case of the Neue Wache, the national media framed much of the
debate about collective identity and the relationship to the Nazi past according
to representations of four West German interest groups: politicians, victims, his-
torical experts and citizen initiatives. Consequently, I suggest that East Germans,
among other marginalized groups, were excluded from participating in this
(West) German ‘public’ realm.
Within the confines of the (West German) media debates, criticisms were
raised regarding the approval process of the memorial and about the function,
form and ‘forgetfulness’ of the Neue Wache . Concerns articulated by critics can
be seen as a response to the historical uses of national institutions in Germany,
a sensitivity to exclusive religious (but not gendered) symbols to represent the
nation and a difficulty in reconciling the social categories of victim and perpe-
trator in past, present and future. As a result of these criticisms – and, signifi-
cantly, in response to a longer postwar set of discussions about dealing with the
National Socialist past – officials modified the memorial somewhat before its
unveiling in 1993. At the same time, Berlin activists, whose voices were muted
in the national press, created alternative cultural realms to explore the history
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Figure 2 ~ The redesigned Neue Wache memorial on Unter den Linden in 1994
(photograph taken by the author)
of commemoration in Germany. These citizen groups expanded the parameters
of debate (as traditionally defined by the media) and provided the possibility of
a more inclusive process of public memory, at least locally.
The Neue Wache today is a well-visited traditional commemorative place, as well
as a site of negotiation where official and collective memories, media represen-
tation and local cultural productions become enmeshed. Before describing its
history and the debates surrounding its establishment, I first outline the themes
of landscape and memory that inform this study.
Landscape and public memor y
There is a large literature on official urban landscapes of memory – museums,
memorials and monuments – as stages or backdrops framing myths of national
identity.5 Boyer calls such spaces ‘rhetorical topoi . . . those civic compositions
that teach us about our national heritage and our public responsibilities and
assume that the urban landscape itself is the emblematic embodiment of power
and memory.’6 The creation of rhetorical topoi, of official landscape stages, is
both a dramaturgical and a territorial act. Cultural practices and rituals, such
as laying wreaths at national memorials or festive parades that take place along
a prescribed route, ‘naturalize’ a collective identity as citizens physically enact
what is normal, appropriate or possible for a group at a particular setting.7 Of
course, social groups may not agree with the official meanings of these land-
scapes and staged rituals; they may decide to take over existing topoi or create
their own sites of memory. These more localized territorial struggles over the
meanings of the built environment often reflect larger social (and power) dis-
putes about who has the authority to create, define, interpret and represent col-
lective pasts through place.8
Yet popular memory should not be conceived only as a binary opposite to
official memory. Rather, public memory results from a more fluid process of
negotiation between officials, local groups, academics, journalists and others in
the cultural sphere.9 As Marita Sturken has argued, public memory can be
thought of as ‘entangled’ with the very objects of its negotiation, entities that
include historical narratives, official memory, collective memories, landscapes,
narratives, films and other cultural productions.10 Here I define ‘collective mem-
ory’ in Jonathan Webber’s terms as the dynamic process by which groups map
myths (in an anthropological sense) about themselves and their world onto a
specific time and place.11 Collective memory therefore is not an accumulation
of individual recollections; rather, it includes all the activities that go into mak-
ing a version of the past resonate with group members.12 Because collective iden-
tities are defined in part by perceived group needs in the present and projected
future, these social narratives about the past are always changing.
If group myths are continuously in flux, one way to provide a sense of tem-
poral stability is by projecting narratives about the past onto places and/or their
representations. For example, in describing the history of Christian group
identity, Maurice Halbwachs argued that the earliest religious rituals were most
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successful when a story had a ‘double focus’, a tangible object like a monument
or place, and a shared group symbol that was ‘superimposed on this physical
reality’.13 Similarly, geographers have defined landscapes as duplicitous because
on the one hand they are materially experienced (that is, we can touch, see,
smell and taste our surroundings), while on the other they can simultaneously
function as social symbols. During times of social unrest, for example, a group
may use culturally familiar and comforting images (such as an ancient castle or
rugged mountain peak) to project a stable picture of reality. As Halbwachs and
Lowenthal suggest, the image of permanence projected by a landscape feature
is often more important than historically accurate information about the place
in legitimating a group’s sense of self.14
If collective memory involves the ongoing process of creating group myths
about the past as, for example, expressed through landscapes and their repre-
sentations, then public memory is the cultural space and process through which
those myths are understood, interpreted and negotiated by a society. Where this
cultural memory of a ‘people’ is expressed, according to Sturken, is ‘outside the
avenues of formal historical discourse yet is entangled with cultural products
and imbued with cultural meaning’.15 In other words, the cultural arena, rather
than the academy, is the domain of public memory. Through various forms of
the media, cultural landscapes, social institutions and the marketplace, public
memory is valued and communicated by social groups. In contrast, historical
narratives are more narrowly defined according to communities of scholars, for-
mal university institutional networks, publishing firms and public and private
granting establishments. As such, the practice of history and the process of pub-
lic memory often overlap; within the cultural realm, for example, groups may
selectively use the products of historical discourse to obtain social support for
their goals.16
To reiterate, public memory is where and how groups struggle to gain cul-
tural authority to selectively represent and narrate their past. Part of that process
includes the creation and appropriation of landscapes, cultural objects, narra-
tives (and here I include formal histories) and images by groups to support their
social myths of identity. When and where collective memories come into con-
flict, as is often the case at particular places or through their representations,
the results can be quite politicized. Public memory therefore can belong to the
domain of cultural politics ‘where (social) meanings are negotiated and rela-
tions of dominance and subordination are defined and contested’.17
In the sections that follow, I describe the entanglement of public memory –
official and local views of the past that intersect, define, and are defined by his-
torical narratives, the printed press (newspaper articles and books), and cultural
productions (demonstration and exhibition) – at the Neue Wache. Because his-
torical narratives about this memorial have been used and produced by differ-
ent groups to support their interpretations, I offer a brief chronological sketch
of the Neue Wache as a context to the public debates. Following this overview, I
discuss the role of the media, West German social relations and the criticisms
and cultural productions that have influenced the form and interpretations of
the memorial.
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Staging the past: of ficial memory at the
Neue Wache
The Neue Wache18 is located along Unter den Linden in what is known as the
historic district of Berlin, a part of the city that dates back to at least the sev-
enteenth century. At this time Berlin’s City Palace, built upon the foundations
of the medieval fortress, was the symbolic centre of the city. From the creation
of Unter den Linden in 1647 by Friedrich Wilhelm, the Great Elector who cre-
ated a royal Prussia, the grand boulevard functioned as the city’s main thor-
oughfare and ritual space. Over the next 200 years, various buildings and
monuments were built along the processional route.19 For example, in 1791
Friedrich Wilhelm II sought to change the warmongering image of Prussia asso-
ciated with his predecessor, Frederick the Great (King Friedrich II), and built
the Brandenburg Gate along Unter den Linden as a symbol of peace. When
Napoleon captured Berlin in 1806, he stormed through the gateway to capture
the ‘heart’ of the city, a dramatic entrance intended to signal the beginning of
a republican era. This phase was short-lived and in 1814, the triumphant
Prussian king re-entered the city through the renamed ‘Victory Gate’ along the
Prussian via triumphalis, or Unter den Linden.20
Upon his return to Berlin, King Friedrich Wilhelm III sought to end the lib-
eral reforms of the Napoleonic period and return to the pre-1806 ancien régime.
Between 1815 and 1848 Prussia oscillated between local monarchy and core ter-
ritory of an emerging German nation-state.21 In response to calls for democra-
tic reforms and social instability following French occupation, the king sought
to legitimate the monarchy through a redesigned, monumental royal city cen-
tre. These plans, including the construction of a royal palace guard (the Neue
Wache), bore witness to citizens and visitors that Prussia not only had defeated
Napoleon but was becoming a growing power in Europe.
Prussia’s royal guard
The king commissioned his new head architect, Karl Friedrich Schinkel, to build
the Neue Wache and propose designs for the new city centre. Schinkel would
become internationally famous for this work and his neoclassical projects left a
lasting imprint on the city’s built environment.22 Schinkel’s palace guardhouse
was a classical monument, a synthesis of Roman castrum and Greek temple that
exaggerated the structure’s material and symbolic presence. The frontal portico
of six double rows of Greek Doric columns created deep recesses and dramatic
shadows that contrasted with the solid, cubic structure. The crisp edges of the
building were emphasized by the soft foliage of chestnut trees planted around
the structure.
Although the pavilion was small, it was located near important royal buildings
including the baroque Prussian Armory (the Zeughaus), the City Palace, the
Opera House and the Palace of Prince Heinrich (later the Friedrich Wilhelm
University). Schinkel’s design for the Neue Wache reflected his larger plans for
the renovation of Unter den Linden. He envisioned Prussia’s via triumphalis as
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a ceremonial boulevard lined with neoclassical buildings, classical mythological
sculptures, public monuments and graceful trees along which military parades
would progress. From at least the early nineteenth century, therefore, the
streetscapes of Unter den Linden were intended as a monumental and orderly
projection of royal power.23 Later, in the mid- to late nineteenth century, this
symbolic promenade came to represent the rise of Berlin from royal seat to
capital city. Citizens would gather along the boulevard and visit the museums,
university, library, opera house, theatres, embassies and cathedrals now located
in the city centre, many of which were built or redesigned by Schinkel. The
grandeur of this urban landscape image – of romantic vistas, ornate buildings,
elite cultural institutions and parading armies and citizens – often concealed
political conflicts within the monarchy and within a society that was moving
toward the creation of the modern state ultimately established in 1871.
The Neue Wache as a national war memorial
When the monarchy ended in 1918, the Neue Wache lost its function as the royal
palace guard. Its ceremonial function, however, was maintained, for in 1930 the
state erected a memorial to commemorate Germany’s fallen soldiers in the First
World War (Gedächtnisstätte für die Gefallenen des Weltkrieges). The material and
symbolic transformation of the Neue Wache into a war memorial occurred dur-
ing what Gillis defines as a ‘national phase of commemoration’, a historical
period when the dead, rather than the living, symbolized the nation and in
which temporal frameworks of identity were selectively defined by male elites.24
It was a form of commemoration that reified the division between a masculine
public sphere and a feminine private sphere by encouraging visitors to view the
fallen soldiers as Germania’s lost sons. The brave soldiers who defended national
boundaries and died protecting their homeland (figured as the sphere of women
and children) were commemorated (by an overwhelmingly male officialdom)
through statuary in the public spaces of the capital city. Heroes were remem-
bered as actors in the life-history of the nation; at such national memorials
women were simply ignored.25
The interior of the Neue Wache was redesigned by Heinrich Tessenow in 1931.
A large gold- and silver-plated oak wreath was set atop a two-metre-high black
marble block in the centre of the room’s sleek granite floors, and illuminated
by a shaft of light coming through a circular opening in the ceiling. Although
Tessenow’s interior space was modern for its day, the sculptural forms evoked
traditional aesthetics commonly found at First World War cemeteries. According
to Winter, public art found at cemeteries built after 1918 emphasized a univer-
sal language to communicate their message, simultaneously drawing on and tran-
scending particular traditions.26 The oak wreath at the Neue Wache was clearly a
symbol of nationalist ideals, for ‘Nature herself was to serve as a living memor-
ial . . . The oak, whose symbolic strength had been invoked during the Wars of
Liberation, was considered the “German tree”.’27 Oak trees had become memo-
rials at German military cemeteries: Heldenheine, or heroes’ groves, stood strong,
yet alone, in a field. The memorial’s marble block also symbolized primeval
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power; the boulder, like the oak tree, was used in German war monuments to
emphasize the strength of the nation and an ideal of the genuine and endur-
ing, as opposed to the modern. These traditional symbols of nature were liter-
ally illuminated at the Neue Wache by the shaft of light coming through the
ceiling, an architectonic form connecting the nation to antiquity through its ref-
erence to the Pantheon.28
It is difficult today to ascertain how individuals and groups experienced this
memorial. Whalen, for one, has suggested that ‘the whole experience [of cre-
ating a national memorial] exacerbated the sense that the dead were still not
at peace’.29 We do know that Weimar officials and elites interpreted the memo-
rial in opposed ways. In the 1931 dedication ceremony, for example, Social
Democrat Otto Braun dedicated the ‘most Prussian site of all of Prussia’ (the
Neue Wache) as a site of mourning as well as a national promise to avoid such
bloodshed in the future. Germany’s generals disagreed with this interpretation
and boycotted the opening ceremonies (only three attended); they felt Braun
was anti-patriotic, vaterlandlos. The Nazi newspaper mocked Braun and the
ceremonies. And the Communist Party (KPD) did not attend because it had just
severed the ties with the Social Democrats (SPD).30
Commemorating Nazi heros
With the rise of the National Socialist regime barely two years later, the Neue
Wache was transformed to provide a new ritual framework. In 1933 an enormous
oak wreath was placed on each side of the pavilion’s facade and a large wooden
oak cross added to the interior room (Figure 3). Although the physical trans-
formation of the memorial was minimal, the exterior neoclassical structure,
together with the addition of the cross, sought to stabilize Hitler’s myth of ‘the
thousand-year Reich’. The placing of the Christian symbol in the interior room
transformed the oak wreath and boulder into a secular altar, as the interprestive
field of the cross redefined German national icons. The sacred associations of
the cross were intended to legitimize Hitler’s fiction that the Nazi state was
chosen by God as the successor of the Holy Roman Empire. Furthermore, the
meanings of Christ’s death and resurrection symbolized by the cross were also
to be understood according to Nazi ideology. In the Third Reich, a soldier’s
death was not considered a loss, but rather a necessary act for the renewal
and resurrection of the state. Like the Christ-figure, a solider who died
serving his people would become immortal through his symbolic resurrection
into the body politic of the German Volk.31 By selectively combining more
general Christian meanings with specific Nazi myths, the new material form
of the Neue Wache was intended to define the German people as ‘the true
Christendom’.
As a sacred space, the Neue Wache became a ritual site of the structured Nazi
calendar. In 1931, on its establishment as a war memorial, it was called a
Gedächtnisstätte, literally ‘a place of remembrance’. Under the National Socialists
it was renamed Ehrenmal, or a (Reich) memorial of honour. Thus transformed,
the Neue Wache became a place of honour, rather than strictly of commemora-
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tion and mourning. On ‘Hero’s Day’, Hitler and his dignitaries laid ceremonial
wreaths at the Neue Wache and citizens gathered along Unter den Linden to
watch the Wehrmacht parade. A military watch, rather than civilian guard, was
posted at the memorial under the National Socialists and the popular spectacle
of the changing of the guard became a regular tourist attraction.
An anti-fascist site of memory
After the Second World War, Berlin’s historic district lay within the Soviet occu-
pation zone and later became part of the German Democratic Republic (GDR).
Officials of the new East German socialist state rejected the values communi-
cated along Unter den Linden’s landscapes, in particular those of Prussian and
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Figure 3 ~ The inner room of the Neue Wache after 1933 (photograph reproduced by
courtesy of the Deutsches Historisches Museum)
Nazi imperialism. The Socialist Unity Party (SED) of the GDR altered the spa-
tial organization and morphology of their capital city to reflect new values of
international communism. In the late 1950s, the Hohenzollern City Palace was
dynamited and replaced with a modernist building that housed the GDR
government (called the Palace of the Republic). In 1961, the Brandenburg
(‘Victory’) Gate was sealed off with the construction of the Berlin Wall. The
Neue Wache, which had been severely damaged during the war (Figure 4), was
repaired in 1951–2 and in 1957 was renovated as a memorial to victims of
fascism. The original neoclassical design was used for the exterior and
Tessenow’s marble block, disfigured by fire, was left as a stark reminder of the
destruction of the Nazi regime (the wreath had been stolen in 1948).32 The Neue
Wache was officially designated a Mahnmal für die Opfer des Faschismus und
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Figure 4 ~ The inner room of the Neue Wache following the Second World War
(photograph taken by Robert Capa in 1945, reproduced by courtesy of the Cornell
Capa)
Militarismus, a site of admonishment that communicated the message ‘never
again!’ to German citizens.33
During the second part of the Cold War, the Mahnmal, as a type of memor-
ial in the GDR, became associated with the myth of anti-fascism, an official nar-
rative underwriting the socialist party’s leadership. It defined East Germany as
a state dedicated to fighting fascism in all its forms, from Nazism to capitalism.
High-ranking party officials were designated the moral leaders of Germany
because of their histories as communist resistance fighters persecuted by Nazis.34
The cultural rituals that naturalized anti-fascism were enacted on the hallowed
earth where national martyrs suffered and died, that is, at concentration camp
sites like Buchenwald.35 Thus, in 1969, the twentieth anniversary of the social-
ist state, the Neue Wache was transformed into a secular altar to anti-fascism
(Figure 5). Its interior room was redesigned to include the GDR coat of arms
and an eternal flame, under which were buried urns that contained sacred relics:
soils from concentration camp sites (Auschwitz, Mauthausen, Natzweiler, Dachau
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Figure 5 ~ The redesigned interior room of the East German memorial, 1969 (photo-
graph reproduced by courtesy of the Landesbildstelle, Berlin)
and Buchenwald), the remains of an unknown resistance fighter shot during an
evacuation march, the remains of one unknown German soldier and soils from
battlefields (Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Normandy, Italy, Norway, Prague
and Berlin).36 In this form, the memorial functioned as a cemetery bringing
together the memory of resistance fighters and the GDR military. The burning
flame paid tribute to them, an emblem of the state’s continued struggle against
fascism. Externally, the image of the Neue Wache was that of goose-stepping
soldiers protecting the sacred site, a physical presence suggesting continuity
from past to present. A more populist ritual was introduced by the state, as newly
wed brides were encouraged to make a pilgrimage along Unter den Linden,
from government buildings to the memorial, in order to lay their wedding
bouquets before the eternal flame, paying tribute and gaining the blessings
of the ‘holy’ memory of resistance fighters. Such secular rites were a means of
legitimating the socialist state in everyday life and counterpoised to conventional
Christian ceremonies.37
Redesigning the Neue Wache after unification
A redesigned Neue Wache was ceremoniously unveiled on 14 November 1993
when Chancellor Kohl laid a wreath at the new national memorial (Zentrale
Gedenkstätte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für die Opfer von Krieg und
Gewaltherrschaft).38 In the words of the plaque to the right of the entrance: ‘The
new guardhouse is the place of memory and remembrance of the victims of war
and tyranny’, a central German memorial dedicated to those who died during
‘the two World Wars and the two dictatorships’.39 The exterior of the structure
remains true to Schinkel’s original designs (see Figure 2) and the interior room
is based upon Tessenow’s 1931 granite floor and a circular roof opening. As a
gesture to East Germans, the buried urns remain. What is new is the central
sculpture in the interior room: a five-times-enlarged copy of Käthe Kollwitz’s
1937 statue, ‘Mourning mother with dead son’ (see Figures 6 and 7).
Following the economic, social and psychological adjustments of unification
in 1990, the official attempt to create a traditional ritual space in order to enact
a singular German memory and provide continuity between past and present
should have come as no surprise. Because Berlin was the place where the ide-
ological competition between the two German states was most dramatically
expressed, after unification many East German institutions in the historic dis-
trict were quickly shut down. Many were viewed as symbols of Germany’s divi-
sion, a direct consequence and thus reminder, of National Socialism. A socialist
built environment was considered inappropriate to the new Germany, a demo-
cratic nation that had ‘won’ the Cold War and could now move to a future unen-
cumbered by the remnants of recent pasts.40
Although there was widespread support for the memorial, as evidenced by the
representatives attending the opening ceremonies, there were also a number of
social groups who opposed the rededication of the Neue Wache. Heated debates
took place in local and national newspapers, on television talk shows and at local
events and actions. These public deliberations about the establishment of the
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new national memorial in Berlin resonated within a longer-standing history of
(pre-unification) West German cultural understandings concerning the signifi-
cance of the National Socialist past in contemporary society.
Negotiating public memory: debates in the media
If public memory takes place in the cultural arena, then media productions,
such as newspaper articles, are places where collective memories are framed,
negotiated and entangled. Media’s coverage of an event may generate a larger
public interest and participation in the establishment, form and interpretation
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Figure 6 ~ The redesigned inner room of the Neue Wache (photograph taken in 1994
by the author)
of such places as the Neue Wache. At the very least, people may comment on ‘the
news’ in everyday spaces like the home, the neighbourhood bar, day care cen-
tres or at the workplace. But even as the media expands the possibility for pub-
lic discussion, it simultaneously limits the terms of public debate and the voices
heard. Notwithstanding the fact that the numerous newspapers in Germany
reflect a wide range of political leanings, the search to maximize readership and
profits often results in a simplistic rendering of complex topics, the translation
of diverse opinions into sound-bite quotes and the use of stereotypes to encour-
age reader identification.
Through a qualitative content analysis of newspaper articles about the Neue
Wache, I identify two ways in which media framed public debates.41 First, opin-
ions were privileged according to West German interest group representations.
Second, criticisms of the memorial were classified according to established
points of contention, some of which made reference to previous media events
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Figure 7 ~ The Neue Wache’s central sculpture in the interior room, a five-times enlarged
Käthe Kollwitz 1937 statue, ‘Mourning mother with dead son’ (photograph taken in 1994
by the author)
in the Federal Republic. Before commenting upon these social roles and criti-
cisms, however, I describe the larger social and historical West German frame-
work in which post-unification media debates about the Neue Wache are situated.
The media and Erinnerungspolitik
Through the media, the memorial came to symbolize (and become enmeshed
with) existing public memory disputes about the role of the National Socialist
past within contemporary German social relations. Forms of social circumspec-
tion are referred to as Vergangenheitsbewältigung, mastering the Nazi past, or
Aufarbeitung and Auseinandersetzung (mit) der Vergangenheit, working through or
confronting the past.42 Taken together, these culturally specific West German con-
cepts refer to a form of ‘memory politics’ – Erinnerungspolitik – that dates back
to at least the mid-to late 1950s about such topics as denazification and public-
education programmes, annual retribution payments to Israel and the
Nuremberg trials. More recent discussions included such events as Willy Brandt’s
visit to the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial in Poland; the student revolutions in the
1960s; a decade of radical left-wing terrorism and social unrest in the 1970s;
scholarly debates, articles and books about the Holocaust, the Second World
War and the Third Reich; the production of films and autobiographies about
the recent past (both foreign and domestic); and the establishment of public
projects like national historical institutions and monuments. The public discus-
sions of the Neue Wache , therefore, constitute the first media event of what this
concept meant following unification.
In contrast to this West German tradition of public media debate, East
German press reports about the social responsibility for the past were defined
by the SED party (often in terms of the anti-fascist myth and as framed by larger
Eastern bloc politics). A more ‘open’ discussion took place behind closed doors
(and at personal risk) with family members over kitchen tables or with trusted
friends in churches. Therefore, although the media controversies about the Neue
Wache occurred in post-unification Berlin, they must be situated within this
divided history of public memory that, after unification, continued to be framed
by the (West) German media. As a result, the possible opinions of East Germans
were not reported by the press because they were not recognized by the media
(or perhaps by the reading ‘public’) as legitimate or authoritative actors. Only
when they fitted existing interest group categories (which I discuss below) were
these voices represented. In addition, communist societies were not structured
by the Western dualism of public/private spheres, but rather by state/family
arenas. East Germans therefore may have found it difficult to enter media-
driven ‘public’ debates, even if they wished to, because they did not have a his-
tory of participating in this West German memory tradition.43
Another significant aspect of Erinnerungspolitik is the approval process for pub-
lic institutions, buildings and artwork. In the Federal Republic, before a public
project can be authorized by the parliament, a formal competition is carried
out. During this lengthy procedure, the media interrogate the social meaning
of the institution or artwork, the various proposals submitted and the winning
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submission. Newspaper articles are often considered by politicians in parlia-
mentary debates and by members of quasi-public expert commissions when
selecting the winning project. In other words, in (West) Germany a memorial
is viewed (at least in theory) as the outcome of a public process of working through
the past, not just an official staging or representation of history.
In the case of the Neue Wache, however, no competition or formal hearings
took place; the memorial was approved on 27 January 1993 by the Chancellor’s
cabinet without debate in the federal parliament. Groups with a vested interest
in this political process were outraged about what they saw as an undemocratic
means of approving the memorial. Without the ‘normal’ public competition for
the memorial, the motives of the federal government were questioned and con-
sidered an attempt at Vergangenheitsbewältigung, mastering the Nazi past. Ignatz
Bubis, the General Secretary of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, was
surprised when he heard that the plans had been passed without the public dis-
cussion that he felt was an essential part of defining a memorial in Germany.44
Members of the Social Democratic opposition party called for a stop in the trans-
formation of the memorial in 1993 in order to rethink its concept, and spoke
on behalf of victim groups: ‘Neither the Central Council of Jews nor the Central
Council of German Sinti and Roma, neither the Victims of Euthanasia-Politics
nor the Persecuted Homosexuals have had to date the chance to discuss the
concept with the federal government.’45 In the words of journalist Mariam
Niroumand: ‘It is hard to say what is more horrifying: the brutal indifference,
the shameless apology, or the ending of a debate from above, a debate that
never once began, which would have brought about a social decision about who
mourns for whom in whose name.’46 Reinhard Koselleck, the most vocal histo-
rian in these debates, argued that the lack of a public ‘battle’ effectively extin-
guished 50 arduous years of the conflict-laden memory-work in Germany, that
is, of working through German experiences, of collectively deciding what the
most appropriate form of commemoration should be and of continuing histor-
ical research about the Nazi period.47
As these quotes indicate, discussions about memorials are part of a collective
negotiation, an Erinnerungspolitik defined by particular social roles and processes.
I now turn to the interest groups that have been given a voice in these West
German media debates, before describing the main points of contention con-
cerning the Neue Wache.
Interest groups in West German public memory debates
Analysing the newspaper articles about the memorial, I identify at least four
interest groups that were delineated in the press and that resonated within the
cultural history of West German Erinnerungspolitik. First, and most importantly,
groups were defined by their political party affiliation. Although Germany has
a multi-party system, the media often present political opinions as either sup-
porting or opposing the current party or coalition in power. In 1993, the
Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU) was in office at city-state and national
levels, while the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was in opposition. The other
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major party, the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) (which has been struggling
to define a post-unification identity), is often in a coalition with the party in
power (in this case the CDU). A fourth, more recent, national-level party, the
Greens, defines a distinct platform from the two main parties, but has at times
worked with the SPD. Following unification, the party allied itself with a new
eastern party to become Alliance ’90/the Greens. The Party of Democratic
Socialism (PDS) is a new national party based upon the former East German
Socialist Unity Party (SED) (the central ruling communist party of the GDR)
and is supported by a large East German constituency. It is through the PDS
that East Germans were offered a voice in the debates, although they were
treated with suspicion because of the party’s history. Finally, at local levels, a
number of smaller, protest or alternative parties have formed since unification
(and earlier in West Berlin).48 For the Neue Wache dedication ceremonies,
representatives from the three major parties (CDU, SPD and FDP) appeared,
denoting some consensus of approval for the memorial. Members of the Alliance
’90/the Greens and the PDS explicitly did not attend, and some members of
the SPD also boycotted the ceremonies.
A second category that is important for understanding these discussions is the
so-called ‘victim groups’ in German society. Socially constructed as the opposite
of ‘perpetrators’, these groups represent the peoples who were systematically
persecuted and murdered by National Socialists; they all have international affil-
iations. These groups were not as involved in the Neue Wache discussions as one
might expect, largely because of the simultaneous debate over the establishment
of a central Holocaust Memorial in Berlin. For the case of the Neue Wache, the
national spokesperson for the Central Council of Jews, Ignatz Bubis (associated
with the FDP), was critical of the memorial in the early part of the discussions
but ultimately agreed to a compromise solution (which I discuss below) and
attended the wreath-laying ceremony with Chancellor Kohl.49 Representatives of
the Central Council of Sinti and Roma were also present for dedication cere-
monies. The Berlin Jewish community, however, did not attend, nor did the
Association of Political Persecutees of the Nazi Regime (VVN).50 Groups repre-
senting victims, such as those persecuted under Stalinism and communism,
approved the memorial.
Well-educated professionals, including academic historians, local historians,
artists, art historians, historic preservationists, museum experts, memorial cen-
tre educators and directors and a select group of publicists and journalists con-
stituted a third group involved in public memory discussions. The opinions of
such experts are normally respected in German society; historians, in particu-
lar, are seen as the moral voice of the nation and often write articles about cul-
tural identity and collective responsibility for the National Socialist past.
Through the media, academics may gain public respect and sometimes even
scholarly notoriety, as evidenced in the long-standing ‘Historians’ Debate’ of the
mid-1980s when the sociologist Jürgen Habermas attacked the respected
German historians Ernst Nolte and Andreas Hillgruber for writing revisionist
histories.51 In the Neue Wache discussions, the social historian Reinhard Koselleck
had a prominent voice and remains critical of the memorial. Artists and art
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historians from Berlin’s Academy of Art also participated in the debates, but
were given less prominence in the media.
A fourth category – and for the Neue Wache debates, one that is associated
with the reputation of political radicalism in Berlin and was reported on mostly
by the local press – includes citizen initiatives and alternative groups. Individual
members that do get media attention are often scholars or professionals, and
as a result the national media interpret them as belonging to the third group
rather than representing a local perspective. The national press also associates
these groups with opposition or alternative parties. For the Neue Wache debates,
the local citizen initiative, the Active Museum for Resistance to Fascism in Berlin
(Aktives Museum Faschismus und Widerstand in Berlin, e.V., hereafter Active
Museum), organized many protest activities. The national Protestant youth orga-
nization, Aktion Sühnezeichen/Friedensdienste, was also critical of the memorial.
In general, these four overlapping interest group representations can be seen
as familiar characters engaged in West German controversies about social
responsibility and the National Socialist past. With this in mind, I turn to a dis-
cussion of the main types of argument surrounding the Neue Wache.
Three points of contention
As expressed in newspaper articles, the logic of most criticisms could be classi-
fied according to one of the following three overlapping arguments: (1) the
function of the memorial as a public institution; (2) the form of the memorial;
and (3) which dead should be commemorated.52 The most serious official chal-
lenge (albeit as distilled by the media) related to the last concern: namely, how
victims and perpetrators should be remembered in Germany.
The national memorial as a type of place. A common theme that emerged in dis-
cussions was a concern about the function of a traditional memorial in present-
day Germany. The very existence of a national place of memory was considered
an inappropriate type of place in German society, especially when bearing in
mind the legacy of National Socialism, as evidenced by post-unification neo-Nazi
activity and xenophobic acts of violence (particularly apparent in 1992–93 dur-
ing these media debates). Citing the history of the Neue Wache during the Nazi
and GDR periods, critics argued that no memorial or landscape should func-
tion again as a stage for nationalistic ritual. The very concept of a central
public institution, they argued, raised this ugly heritage of nationalism and
challenged Germany’s postwar democratic history of federalism.
Implicit in this concern about centralized, national institutions is a sense of
social unease about the historical uses and functions of the capital city as a sym-
bol of the nation and a related larger critique of the cultural politics of the CDU
since the early 1980s.53 Indeed, the establishment of a system of strong local and
state-level autonomy in West Germany was a direct response to the centralized
National Socialist state (most dramatically expressed in Berlin’s landscapes) and
to Allied, in particular American, denazification programmes. In more recent
years, critics of the CDU were quite concerned with Kohl’s attempts at nation-
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building, especially regarding his proposals to establish national history
museums in Bonn and Berlin and a war memorial in Bonn.54 When asked in
1985 why he supported the construction of the war memorial, Kohl responded
that every national capital in the world – with the exception of West Germany
– had a place where dignitaries could lay their wreaths on official occasions in
an appropriate manner.55 Such a response did not sit well with critics of the
CDU administration, who are wary of what they describe as Kohl’s ‘pet projects,’
that is, cultural institutions imposed from above rather than emerging from state
or local levels. The Neue Wache was viewed as such a project by many groups
because of the way it was approved without the normal public competition
process.
The Neue Wache, moreover, when considered as one project among other pro-
posed traditional, national places, can be understood within the context of the
administration’s pre-unification political agenda, what I call the ‘cultural poli-
tics of normalization’.56 Although the goal to create a ‘normal’ nation after
National Socialism has been part of the official German policy since the time
of Konrad Adenauer, under Kohl normalization came to mean that Germany
should be simultaneously defined as a cultural nation and a European political
state. The former notion implies Western ideas of individual freedom and
national self-determination and the latter demands surrendering certain sover-
eign rights to such supranational organizations as the EU and NATO. Under
the Kohl administration, Willy Brandt’s notion of normal relations between the
Eastern and Western blocs were continued, but at the same time a neo-
Adenauerian notion of shared Western values was promoted. Since the mid-
1980s, these values meant not only the promise of unification but also the
freedom to define national sovereignty without being viewed with suspicion by
other Western countries. In the cultural realm, this included, to use Michael
Stürmer’s words (a conservative historian and former political adviser of Kohl),
the renewal of national self-confidence by providing positive images of the past:
‘In a land without history, whoever fills memory, coins the concepts and inter-
prets the past, wins the future.’57
After 1990, normalization as a strategy appears to have expanded somewhat
to include defining what it means to be ‘European’, a cultural form of identi-
fication that resonated with Kohl’s political and economic agenda to strengthen
Germany’s role in the European Union. Current proposals for the reconstruc-
tion of Berlin’s historic district, of which the Neue Wache is part, favour ‘typical’
(yet vague) European landscape images of ‘appropriate’ royal, pre-national
pasts.58 For example, the Hohenzollern City Palace, which was completely demol-
ished by the GDR in the 1950s is now under consideration for reconstruction
by German businessmen as a private initiative. In 1993, a trompe-l’œil of the four-
storey historic palace was erected across from the ‘Museum Island’ in Marx-
Engels-Platz to give Berliners an idea of how a new Unter den Linden landscape
might look, and to find sponsors for the project.59 The Brandenburg Gate has
reopened and the copper quadriga was refurbished to its pre-GDR image: the
goddess Nike’s staff is based upon Schinkel’s designs (used from 1814–1945)
with an Iron Cross within a wreath, on top of which sits a Prussian eagle.60
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Schinkel’s designs for Unter den Linden have become fashionable, as demon-
strated by the renovation of historic buildings in the ‘Museum Island’, includ-
ing the baroque Zeughaus, Schinkel’s masterpiece, the Altes Museum, and
buildings designed by his student Friedrich August Stüler, the Neues Museum and
the Nationalgalerie. Quasi-public tours bring Berlin’s visitors to the ‘350 years of
history’ along Unter den Linden; historic maps, photographs, sketches and news-
paper articles are used in conjunction with existing buildings, ruins, or empty
sites to stir a tourist’s imagination of this more grandiose past.
Such a romanticized image of Berlin, projected alongside high-tech repre-
sentations of futuristic new business complexes, is promoted by businessmen
as well as by officials. The pre-national is a safe and seemingly uncontested
period to recreate when presented as an European rather than purely Prussian
heritage; it is based upon nostalgic landscape icons and highly stylized
histories that attract tourist dollars and provide a sense of pride in the past. It
is a familiar time/space to create during a period of unprecedented change.
Not surprisingly, the politics and meaning of such reconstructions have been
called into question by social groups critical of normalization politics. Other
critics view these historic projects as unnecessary luxuries in a city where unem-
ployment is high, infrastructure inadequate, and available housing units are
scarce.
The form of the memorial. Another principal point of contention was the form
of the memorial. Art professionals and historians were concerned with the exclu-
sive religious message of the statue. The Kollwitz sculpture was seen as embody-
ing a particularly Christian form of suffering and thus of German identity. The
statue of the mother holding her dead son, argued many, was a version of the
Pietà, a Christian icon symbolizing salvation through Christ’s death (Figure 7).
How could Jews, for example, be asked to honour their dead through such a
symbol? The sculpture, when interpreted as a Pietà, identified Germans as non-
Jews and thereby excluded the memory of the latter. To counter these criticisms,
supporters of the memorial argued that the Kollwitz sculpture represented a
more universal, non-divisive message of loss. From this perspective, the figure
of a mourning mother could be understood by all social groups in German soci-
ety, including Jews.61
The gender-biased depiction of this ‘universal’ mother, however, was almost
ignored in national media discussions, and was voiced at the local level through
alternative artists’ and citizens’ initiatives and through related publications that
I discuss below.62 Yet in the cultural context of a traditional memorial monu-
ment, the sculpture clearly depicts women as passive mothers, mourning the loss
of sons and husbands whose role it is to protect the nation from external threat.
Such an idealization of motherhood naturalizes the spheres of the public and
private as masculine and feminine respectively, defining women’s sexualities and
social roles exclusively in terms of reproduction. The historian Koselleck argued
that the Pietà figure closed out the public memory not only of Jews, but of
women who were sent to the gas chambers or who died in other ways during
the war. Women, argued Koselleck, were not victims simply because they lost
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their sons – ‘the reality was far worse’.63 Although Koselleck’s criticism was an
attempt to break the traditional private/public dichotomy associated with
national representations, he still suggested that women should be thought of as
victims of some sort. Thus, in the media debates, women were not defined as
socially relevant actors, let alone considered as perpetrators.64
Why were the histories of women during the wars and postwar period silenced
in the national public debates? Why did an exclusively heterosexual symbol of
the nation remain uncontested in 1993? Although this subject is beyond the
scope of this paper, I raise it here to indicate that topics excluded from public
debates are pertinent to the formation of cultural identity at a transitional period
of time. I offer two speculative (and disturbing) suggestions that relate to con-
cerns of national security. First, German unemployment rates rocketed after
1990 and have remained high, particularly for middle-aged men and women in
the East. If women are located ‘at home’, competition for scare jobs could be
reduced, at least in appearance. Such an image, of course, would be particularly
jarring for East German women, who had the highest participation in the work-
force in the world in the late 1980s at 91%, but now constitute 60% of the unem-
ployed.65 Secondly, following unification, there was a general fear that Germany
was becoming inundated with foreigners.66 In the late 1980s, (West) Germans
were facing projections that people of ‘Germanic’ descent would no longer be
the majority ethnic-racial group in the future due to low birth rates. Such
anxieties were exaggerated following 1990, as Germany experienced an influx
of Eastern European and former Soviet Union refugees resulting from civil wars
and the collapse of the Eastern bloc. Imagining German women in ‘natural’
terms – as mothers rather than as citizens and workers – was a culturally
conservative strategy used historically in Germany and elsewhere to offset fears
of ‘foreign invasion’.
A second concern was also articulated about inappropriate uses of aesthetic
and historical forms for the Neue Wache. Historic preservationists, for example,
argued that the proposed designs were inauthentic. Although documentary evi-
dence could have justified renovation to any historical style, the proposed design
was considered a pastiche of architectonic forms and elements from diverse his-
torical periods. Most preservationists argued that reconstructing the pavilion to
its 1931 form, when it was first used as a memorial, would be most appropriate
and historically accurate. Supporters of the proposed memorial, however, did
not view the memorial as an historic artefact to be preserved and renovated,
but rather as a contemporary site of commemoration marked by traces from
each phase of German history.
These media concerns about the form and function of the memorial did
not appear to have a direct impact on official plans. Despite protests at federal
and local levels and the results of an expert hearing (which voted 3–2 against
the memorial), no alternative forms of commemoration were considered. I
turn finally to the third main point of contention, which, when taken together
with the first two points, did result in a small material change in the memorial
design.
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Commemorating the dead. The third main criticism of the Neue Wache was the ‘for-
getfulness’ of the memorial. Of particular concern was the way that it recalled
the dead. Critics argued that by commemorating all the war dead at one loca-
tion, the Neue Wache blurred the social boundaries between those persecuted
and murdered under the Third Reich on the one hand and the SS officers and
high-ranking Nazi functionaries on the other. In other words, the postwar cate-
gories of social identity between victims and perpetrators would be collapsed at
the site. From this perspective, creating a central place of commemoration for
all war dead would mean that all individuals would be made equal through the
category of death. In this way, argued critics, the dead would be neither com-
memorated nor honoured: ‘the dead deserve our attention and respect, the SS
officers don’t belong to that group.’67
By suggesting that the memorial was forgetful, critics alluded to previous
public memory debates in which the Kohl administration was criticized for
attempting to master the past and to represent all Germans as victims of war.
Such media discussions included at least three controversial events. I have
already mentioned the proposal to establish a central memorial in Bonn that
would ‘unite victims and the sacrificed in reconciliatory commemoration’ and
the museums established in Bonn and Berlin that were accused of promoting
revisionist, nationalistic histories. A second event, also mentioned above, was the
ongoing ‘Historians’ Debate’ in which scholars fought about the politics of
writing histories and of using certain methods to represent the National
Socialist period.68 The third event is referred to as the ‘Bitburg Affair’. As part
of the commemorative activities for the 40th anniversary of the end of the
Second World War, Chancellor Kohl and President Reagan made a ceremonial
visit to the military cemetery in Bitburg, a place where 49 members of the
Waffen SS (combat stormtroopers) were buried alongside First and Second
World War German infantry soldiers and Wehrmacht officers. Describing this
event, Anson Rabinbach quoted Kohl to define official CDU reconciliation,
‘when we are able to mourn for human beings, independent of whatever
nationality the murdered, the fallen, the dead once belonged’.69 Rabinbach
argued that by staging this notion of reconciliation in the media, the Kohl
administration was the first publicly to relativize the Holocaust in relation to all
other sufferings inflicted by the war. The historian Charles Maier has defined
this use of the past as ‘Bitburg history’, the mixing together of historical agents
and moral categories that results in the distortion of the logical dependence
of victim and perpetrator and therefore a shared responsibility for wrongs
committed.70
To ensure that ‘all dead would be remembered, not just ‘‘our’’ dead’, the
historian Koselleck simply suggested adding an inscription to the memorial’s
entrance that would read: ‘In memory of those fallen, murdered, gassed, killed,
missing.’71 Although some journalists derided this ‘shopping-list’ approach to
commemoration, Koselleck’s proposal was generally accepted. Once the
proposal was put forth in the public arena, Ignatz Bubis, for one, demanded
that such a text be added to the memorial.
In the context of the media debates about the Neue Wache and, perhaps
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more importantly, in response to a much larger history of discussions about
mastering the past, or Vergangenheitsbewältigung – officials decided belatedly to
add a modified passage from a 1985 speech by former German President
Richard von Weizsäcker. This speech (delivered months after the ‘Bitburg Affair’
and seen by some as a reprimand to the Kohl administration) was the first pub-
lic occasion on which a German official clearly acknowledged differences
between the social groups that suffered during the Second World War. The pas-
sage added to the Neue Wache was inscribed on a bronze plaque to the right of
the entrance to the interior room. It has been translated into eight languages,
and reads:72
We honour the memory of the peoples who suffered from the war.
We remember their citizens who were persecuted and who lost their lives.
We remember those killed in action in the World Wars.
We remember the innocent who lost their lives in war and as a result of war in
their homeland, in captivity and through expulsion.
We remember the millions of Jews who were murdered.
We remember the Sinti and Roma who were murdered.
We remember all those who were killed because of their origin, their
homosexuality or because of sickness and weakness.
We remember all who were murdered, whose right to life was denied.
We remember the people who had to die because of their religious or political
convictions.
We remember all those who were victims of tyranny and met their death, though
innocent.
We remember the women and men who sacrificed their lives in resistance to
despotic rule.
We honour all who suffered death rather than act against their conscience.
We honour the memory of the women and men who were persecuted and
murdered because they resisted totalitarian dictatorship after 1945.
According to Marcuse, although this text is a weaker version of von Weizsäcker’s
1985 speech, it was a significant compromise for officials publicly and in a per-
manent material form, to recognize the distinctions between different social
groups, especially when considering the history of Kohl’s cultural politics of nor-
malization. It may also become the new touchstone for future public memory
debates in Germany, the most notable of which are the ongoing Holocaust
Memorial debates.73
Local memory: alternative cultural realms
Although the media was the dominant arena in which interpretations of the past
were negotiated, citizen initiatives and Berlin groups actively engaged in the
process of public memory locally by hosting cultural events. These can be viewed
as a means of group legitimation through rejection of official interpretations
and the realm of the media. They should also be seen as attempts to create a
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more inclusive, local public discussion and to provide a space for excluded
groups.
For example, artists and art historians, many of them women, felt that their
criticisms were not considered by officials. In national media debates, they
argued that enlarging the Kollwitz sculpture at the Neue Wache was an abuse of
artistic licence. Critics stated that the statue was never intended for such a memo-
rial; since Kollwitz created the sculpture in 1937, she would have been unable
to articulate the horror of the Holocaust.74 Taking her artwork out of that his-
torical context and enlarging it five times as a memorial was artistically inad-
missible. To pay tribute to Kollwitz, the Academy of Arts in Berlin and other
related organizations conducted a series of public lectures and exhibitions about
the artist, her work and her pacifist politics and published a book about the
Neue Wache debates.75 These cultural products expanded the terrain of public
memory debates beyond the traditional limits of the media. Moreover, the
creation of a popular forum for participation and learning was a way of reclaim-
ing interpretive rights over art. Drawing from the history of the artistic com-
munity in Berlin, recognized for its progressive politics, these groups created a
space for an interested public to confront the relationships between an art,
memorials, public space and German identity.
Alternative memorial designs were also envisioned as oppositional spaces
challenging traditional realms of historical authority. Particularly interesting was
one by the Berlin citizen initiative, the Active Museum. This group advocated
leaving the memorial in its East German form and treating the structure as an
historical artefact. Instead of creating a new monument, they wished to decon-
struct the past in situ and thereby create a non-traditional outdoor living
museum. They suggested erecting a system of signboards at different points in
and around the memorial to provide historical information about its physical
transformations under the different Germanies. Through this exhibition, the
uses of the Neue Wache by various government officials would be presented,
and the continuities between past and present narratives of the nation would
be critically addressed.
Such an alternative questions the past and present functions of the Neue Wache.
In this traditional place of memory created by male elites, the dead have sym-
bolized the nation through conventional religious and gendered categories. In
contrast, the citizen initiative’s approach introduced a postmodernism of resis-
tance in challenging both an object (the national memorial) and the social con-
texts within which that object has traditionally been constructed and
interpreted.76 Rather than ‘normalize’, or even avoid, the uncomfortable cate-
gory of the ‘nation’, the proposed outdoor exhibition is a critical reassessment
of places of memory in Germany. Indeed, an individual walking onto the site
would be encouraged to construct a personal relationship to the nation(s)
through an interpretation of texts, photographs and material landscapes.
Moreover, the experience of confronting an inverted traditional ritual space, by
placing an exhibit outside a public memorial familiar through commemorative
ritual, may have led a visitor to reconsider socially expected experiences at sites
of memory in the city.
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The Active Museum’s innovative and self-critical challenge to the history of
landscape and memory in Germany was not officially recognized. In protest, the
group organized a three-month-long exhibition with eleven historical placards
(including the contemporary debates) that opened days before the memorial
dedication ceremony at the former East German Humboldt University, located
next to the Neue Wache (see Figure 1). They also published an accompanying
exhibition book with articles about the history of the memorial and critical essays
about its new design. Located so close to the memorial, this unofficial event par-
alleled official events and attracted visitors going to see the Neue Wache (who
may have been unaware of the controversies).
Outcomes of public memory: the meanings of the
Neue Wache today
One can interpret the Neue Wache simply as a ceremonial stage upon which offi-
cials will continue to perform rituals of nationalism and communicate notions
of collective identity. But such a reading would be limiting and superficial, ignor-
ing other actors who have created meaning at the memorial. In 1993, for exam-
ple, when Kohl and other dignitaries travelled from Bonn to lay the ceremonial
wreath at the Neue Wache, many other individuals made journeys. Neo-Nazis
made pilgrimages to war cemeteries where well-known Nazi functionaries were
buried, local citizen groups conducted protest marches throughout the streets
of Berlin, a sizeable police force was at the Neue Wache, and an irate Holocaust
survivor was arrested for demonstrating against the memorial. The debates,
compromise inscription, alternative proposals and exhibitions suggest that
Berliners recognize the selective nature and inherent contradictions of public
memory work and engage in this process to an unusual degree. Local groups
in particular seem quite aware of the fact that public ‘memory as a form of
knowledge is also a form of resistance’.77
Public sites of memory like the Neue Wache gain their meanings through the
interplay of historical narratives, official cultural politics, local interests, media
representations, expected interest group representations and cultural produc-
tions. Here I have focused on how these agents, institutions and objects have
been framed by the West German media and expressed in other cultural realms.
Two concrete results of this process/site of public memory include the addition
of the compromise plaque. Although the text continues to be criticized as miss-
ing ‘the most taboo elements that electrified the nation in 1985: putting the
Jews first, mentioning the Soviets’ victims, using the word unsäglich, or unspeak-
able’, there appears to be a kind of acceptance of the compromise. The
American historian Harold Marcuse, who wrote these critical words, does not
regard the Neue Wache as the site where Holocaust victims should be commem-
orated. Rather, he views the place as a monument that depicts German’s emo-
tional relationships to the Nazi past, those of sadness and regret.78
The compromise text may be also accepted as part of a larger history of
German Erinnerungspolitik, a set of troublesome and ongoing discussions about
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the meanings (and moral responsibilities) of the social categories of victim and
perpetrator. The controversies surrounding a 1996 historical exhibition in
Munich about the role of the Wehrmacht in the Holocaust, or the 1997 national
public stir created by Daniel Goldhagen’s book, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, which
argued that the Holocaust was the result of a culturally specific German elimi-
nationist anti-Semitism, or the ongoing debates about the national Holocaust
Memorial tell us that the Germans are still working through their troubled past
eight years after unification and will continue to do so. Nonetheless, as the Neue
Wache debates have made clear, these discussions are still largely informed by a
West German cultural hegemony. What is more difficult to discern is how the
presence of East Germans and other marginalized groups will alter this estab-
lished social framework of public memory in the future. How, for example, will
the first post-unification generation of Germans view, experience, interpret and
reappropriate the past and imagine their future at public sites like the Neue
Wache?
A second consequence of the Neue Wache debates is more subtle and local.
Although the Active Museum and the Academy of Arts staged only temporary
activities, their approach reached many who may otherwise have been excluded
from national debates. They may also have inspired some to use the site as an
alternative space of discussion. For example, on a number of occasions when
observing visitors to the Neue Wache in both 1994 and 1997, I noticed local tour
groups stopping there. Tour guides brought with them portable exhibitions, so
to speak, to display historic photos, copies of documents and newspaper arti-
cles, providing critical interpretations that resembled in form and content alter-
native events. Discussions about the meanings of the memorial thus continue to
take place in non-traditional forms. A personal story is revealing: as a guest lec-
turer for an American university historic preservation programme in 1997, I pro-
vided a brief overview of the Neue Wache in the interior room. Unlike the tour
guides with props, I used the actual spaces of the interior room to describe the
changing historical forms of the pavilion; as I gestured to different parts of the
room, my voice echoed loudly against the thick walls. When students asked about
my own opinions of the memorial, I offered some criticisms (in a softer tone).
A memorial guard, perhaps in response to complaints by other visitors, quickly
moved to escort my group outdoors. He claimed that I was being disrespectful
to the memory of the dead; we were ‘out of place’.79 For the rest of the day, the
group kept returning to this encounter and the material spaces of the memor-
ial, wondering whose dead he meant and trying to unpack a much larger set of
meanings about cultural identity and memory in a new Germany.
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